“The coevolution theory of the origin of the genetic code and an its extension” – IAS-Research Talk by Massimo Di Giulio“The coevolution theory of the origin of the genetic code and an its extension” – IAS-Research Talk by Massimo Di Giulio“The coevolution theory of the origin of the genetic code and an its extension” – IAS-Research Talk by Massimo Di Giulio

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Dr.Massimo Di Giulio (Laboratory for Molecular Evolution, Institute of Genetics and Biophysics “Adriano Buzzati-Traverso”, CNR, Napoli, Italy) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “The coevolution theory of  the origin of the genetic code and an its extension” on Friday, June 28th 2013, at 11.30 at the Carlos Santamaria Building Room B14.

Abstract

Background: The coevolution theory of the origin of the genetic code suggests that the genetic code is an imprint of the biosynthetic relationships between amino acids. However, this theory does not seem to attribute a role to the biosynthetic relationships between the earliest amino acids that evolved along the pathways of energetic metabolism. As a result, the coevolution theory is unable to clearly define the very earliest phases of genetic code origin. In order to remove this difficulty, I here suggest an extension of the coevolution theory that attributes a crucial role to the first amino acids that evolved along these biosynthetic pathways and to their biosynthetic relationships, even when defined by the non-amino acid molecules that are their precursors.

Results: It is re-observed that the first amino acids to evolve along these biosynthetic pathways are predominantly those codified by codons of the type GNN, and this observation is found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, the close biosynthetic relationships between the sibling amino acids Ala-Ser, Ser-Gly, Asp-Glu, and Ala-Val are not random in the genetic code table and reinforce the hypothesis that the biosynthetic relationships between these six amino acids played a crucial role in defining the very earliest phases of genetic code origin.

Conclusion: All this leads to the hypothesis that there existed a code, GNS, reflecting the biosynthetic relationships between these six amino acids which, as it defines the very earliest phases of genetic code origin, removes the main difficulty of the coevolution theory. Furthermore, it is here discussed how this code might have naturally led to the code codifying only for the domains of the codons of precursor amino acids, as predicted by the coevolution theory. Finally, the hypothesis here suggested also removes other problems of the coevolution theory, such as the existence for certain pairs of amino acids with an unclear biosynthetic relationship between the precursor and product amino acids and the collocation of Ala between the amino acids Val and Leu belonging to the pyruvate biosynthetic family, which the coevolution theory considered as belonging to different biosyntheses.

“The Autonomies of Bioethics” – IAS-Research Seminar by Ion Arrieta“The Autonomies of Bioethics” – IAS-Research Seminar by Ion Arrieta“The Autonomies of Bioethics” – IAS-Research Seminar by Ion Arrieta

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Date and time: 25th June 2013, at 11.00
Location: Carlos Santamaria Building, Room B14.
Speaker: Ion Arrieta
Title: The Autonomies of Bioethics
Abstract: This presentation begins with a set of distinctions between differents concepts (or families of concepts) of autonomy that are present in the theory and practice of bioethics. My porpuse is to examine how the principle of autonomy works in two different branches of bioethics, health care ethics on the one hand, characterized by the dependence of patients and users of health services, and research ethics on the other, marked by the vulnerability of the subjects. Although differents fields (health care is not a science but a practice or art, while biomedical research does aspire to be scientific), I transfer some intuitions from the first to the second field, especially those emphasizing the interactive and relational nature of autonomy. The fact that autonomy is always relational is more easily seen in healthcare ethics, but not so much in research ethics. Despite that autonomy in research ethics is more formal and less personal, I defend that it needs integrate certain aspects of healtcare, which mainly affect how we understand the autonomy of the patient or research subject in relation to the clinicians or researchers who are treating them.
Date and time: 25th June 2013, at 11.00
Location: Carlos Santamaria Building, Room B14.
Speaker: Ion Arrieta
Title: The Autonomies of Bioethics
Abstract: This presentation begins with a set of distinctions between differents concepts (or families of concepts) of autonomy that are present in the theory and practice of bioethics. My porpuse is to examine how the principle of autonomy works in two different branches of bioethics, health care ethics on the one hand, characterized by the dependence of patients and users of health services, and research ethics on the other, marked by the vulnerability of the subjects. Although differents fields (health care is not a science but a practice or art, while biomedical research does aspire to be scientific), I transfer some intuitions from the first to the second field, especially those emphasizing the interactive and relational nature of autonomy. The fact that autonomy is always relational is more easily seen in healthcare ethics, but not so much in research ethics. Despite that autonomy in research ethics is more formal and less personal, I defend that it needs integrate certain aspects of healtcare, which mainly affect how we understand the autonomy of the patient or research subject in relation to the clinicians or researchers who are treating them.
Date and time: 25th June 2013, at 11.00
Location: Carlos Santamaria Building, Room B14.
Speaker: Ion Arrieta
Title: The Autonomies of Bioethics
Abstract: This presentation begins with a set of distinctions between differents concepts (or families of concepts) of autonomy that are present in the theory and practice of bioethics. My porpuse is to examine how the principle of autonomy works in two different branches of bioethics, health care ethics on the one hand, characterized by the dependence of patients and users of health services, and research ethics on the other, marked by the vulnerability of the subjects. Although differents fields (health care is not a science but a practice or art, while biomedical research does aspire to be scientific), I transfer some intuitions from the first to the second field, especially those emphasizing the interactive and relational nature of autonomy. The fact that autonomy is always relational is more easily seen in healthcare ethics, but not so much in research ethics. Despite that autonomy in research ethics is more formal and less personal, I defend that it needs integrate certain aspects of healtcare, which mainly affect how we understand the autonomy of the patient or research subject in relation to the clinicians or researchers who are treating them.

“Habits as sensorimotor life-forms” – IAS-Research seminar by Matthew Egbert and Xabier E. Barandiaran“Habits as sensorimotor life-forms” – IAS-Research seminar by Matthew Egbert and Xabier E. Barandiaran“Habits as sensorimotor life-forms” – IAS-Research seminar by Matthew Egbert and Xabier E. Barandiaran

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“Habits as sensorimotor life-forms: modelling self-maintaining behaviour with an iterant deformable sensorimotor medium”, Tuesday 18th June, 11am, Carlos Santamaría Building, B14.

Date and Time: 11am, Tuesday 18th June, Carlos Santamaría Building, B14
Title: Habits as sensorimotor life-forms: modelling self-maintaining behaviour with an iterant deformable sensorimotor medium
Abstract: Artificial Life has not yet explored in depth the analogy between life and mind that is hidden in the nature of habits: their self-sustaining dissipative structure as ecological sensorimotor entities. We present a new dynamical model for habits implementing what we call a node-based “iterant deformable sensorimotor medium” (IDSM). The IDSM has properties designed such that trajectories taken through state space increase the likelihood that in the future, similar trajectories will be taken. We couple the IDSM to sensors and motors of a simulated body in a simulated environment and show that under certain conditions, the IDSM resonates with the other parts of the simulation, forming self-maintaining patterns of activity operating over the IDSM, the body, and the environment. These patterns of activity are similar in many respects to habits, patterns of activity that are self-reinforced. We present various environments and the resulting ‘habits’ that form in them, studying the sensorimotor coordination patterns that stabilize in the process. We discuss how this model and extensions of it can help us understand and model self-sustaining patterns of behaviour as building blocks for a theory of cognition that does no rely on representations

Date and Time: 11am, Tuesday 18th June, Carlos Santamaría Building, B14
Title: Habits as sensorimotor life-forms: modelling self-maintaining behaviour with an iterant deformable sensorimotor medium
Abstract: Artificial Life has not yet explored in depth the analogy between life and mind that is hidden in the nature of habits: their self-sustaining dissipative structure as ecological sensorimotor entities. We present a new dynamical model for habits implementing what we call a node-based “iterant deformable sensorimotor medium” (IDSM). The IDSM has properties designed such that trajectories taken through state space increase the likelihood that in the future, similar trajectories will be taken. We couple the IDSM to sensors and motors of a simulated body in a simulated environment and show that under certain conditions, the IDSM resonates with the other parts of the simulation, forming self-maintaining patterns of activity operating over the IDSM, the body, and the environment. These patterns of activity are similar in many respects to habits, patterns of activity that are self-reinforced. We present various environments and the resulting ‘habits’ that form in them, studying the sensorimotor coordination patterns that stabilize in the process. We discuss how this model and extensions of it can help us understand and model self-sustaining patterns of behaviour as building blocks for a theory of cognition that does no rely on representations

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On the origin of the tRNA molecule – IAS-Research Talk by Massimo Di GiulioOn the origin of the tRNA molecule – IAS-Research Talk by Massimo Di GiulioOn the origin of the tRNA molecule – IAS-Research Talk by Massimo Di Giulio

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Dr.Massimo Di Giulio (Laboratory for Molecular Evolution, Institute of Genetics and Biophysics “Adriano Buzzati-Traverso”, CNR, Napoli, Italy) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “On the rigin of the tRNA molecule” on Tuesday, June 11th 2013, at 11.30 at the Carlos Santamaria Building Room B14.

Abstract

A model has been proposed suggesting that the tRNA molecule must have originated by direct duplication of an RNA hairpin structure [Di Giulio, M., 1992. On the origin of the transfer RNA molecule. J. Theor. Biol. 159, 199–214]. A non-monophyletic origin of this molecule has also been theorized [Di Giulio, M., 1999. The non-monophyletic origin of tRNA molecule. J. Theor. Biol. 197, 403–414]. In other words, the tRNA genes evolved only after the evolutionary stage of the last universal common ancestor (LUCA) through the assembly of two minigenes codifying for different RNA hairpin structures, which is what the exon theory of genes suggests when it is applied to the model of tRNA origin. Recent observations strongly corroborate this theorization because it has been found that some tRNA genes are completely separate in two minigenes codifying for the 5’ and 3’ halves of this molecule [Randau, L., et al., 2005a. Nanoarchaeum equitans creates functional tRNAs from separate genes for their 5’ and 3’ halves. Nature 433, 537–541]. It is shown that these tRNA genes codifying for the 5’ and 3’ halves of this molecule are the ancestral form from which the tRNA genes continuously codifying for the complete tRNA molecule are thought to have evolved. This, together with the very existence of completely separate tRNA genes codifying for their 5’ and 3’ halves, proves a non-monophyletic origin for tRNA genes — as a monophyletic origin would exclude the existence of these genes which have, on the contrary, been observed.

Dr.Massimo Di Giulio (Laboratory for Molecular Evolution, Institute of Genetics and Biophysics “Adriano Buzzati-Traverso”, CNR, Napoli, Italy) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “On the rigin of the tRNA Molecule” on Tuesday, June 11th 2013, at 11.30 at the Carlos Santamaria Building Room B14.

Abstract

A model has been proposed suggesting that the tRNA molecule must have originated by direct duplication of an RNA hairpin structure [Di Giulio, M., 1992. On the origin of the transfer RNA molecule. J. Theor. Biol. 159, 199–214]. A non-monophyletic origin of this molecule has also been theorized [Di Giulio, M., 1999. The non-monophyletic origin of tRNA molecule. J. Theor. Biol. 197, 403–414]. In other words, the tRNA genes evolved only after the evolutionary stage of the last universal common ancestor (LUCA) through the assembly of two minigenes codifying for different RNA hairpin structures, which is what the exon theory of genes suggests when it is applied to the model of tRNA origin. Recent observations strongly corroborate this theorization because it has been found that some tRNA genes are completely separate in two minigenes codifying for the 5’ and 3’ halves of this molecule [Randau, L., et al., 2005a. Nanoarchaeum equitans creates functional tRNAs from separate genes for their 5’ and 3’ halves. Nature 433, 537–541]. It is shown that these tRNA genes codifying for the 5’ and 3’ halves of this molecule are the ancestral form from which the tRNA genes continuously codifying for the complete tRNA molecule are thought to have evolved. This, together with the very existence of completely separate tRNA genes codifying for their 5’ and 3’ halves, proves a non-monophyletic origin for tRNA genes — as a monophyletic origin would exclude the existence of these genes which have, on the contrary, been observed.

Dr.Massimo Di Giulio (Laboratory for Molecular Evolution, Institute of Genetics and Biophysics “Adriano Buzzati-Traverso”, CNR, Napoli, Italy) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “On the rigin of the tRNA Molecule” on Tuesday, June 11th 2013, at 11.30 at the Carlos Santamaria Building Room B14.

Abstract

A model has been proposed suggesting that the tRNA molecule must have originated by direct duplication of an RNA hairpin structure [Di Giulio, M., 1992. On the origin of the transfer RNA molecule. J. Theor. Biol. 159, 199–214]. A non-monophyletic origin of this molecule has also been theorized [Di Giulio, M., 1999. The non-monophyletic origin of tRNA molecule. J. Theor. Biol. 197, 403–414]. In other words, the tRNA genes evolved only after the evolutionary stage of the last universal common ancestor (LUCA) through the assembly of two minigenes codifying for different RNA hairpin structures, which is what the exon theory of genes suggests when it is applied to the model of tRNA origin. Recent observations strongly corroborate this theorization because it has been found that some tRNA genes are completely separate in two minigenes codifying for the 5’ and 3’ halves of this molecule [Randau, L., et al., 2005a. Nanoarchaeum equitans creates functional tRNAs from separate genes for their 5’ and 3’ halves. Nature 433, 537–541]. It is shown that these tRNA genes codifying for the 5’ and 3’ halves of this molecule are the ancestral form from which the tRNA genes continuously codifying for the complete tRNA molecule are thought to have evolved. This, together with the very existence of completely separate tRNA genes codifying for their 5’ and 3’ halves, proves a non-monophyletic origin for tRNA genes — as a monophyletic origin would exclude the existence of these genes which have, on the contrary, been observed.

“Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” (SMLC 2013) – 12-14.09.2013, Bergamo, Italy “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” (SMLC 2013) – 12-14.09.2013, Bergamo, Italy“Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” (SMLC 2013) – 12-14.09.2013, Bergamo, Italy

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Call for Papers

Workshop “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” (SMLC 2013)

12-14th September 2013, University of Bergamo, Italy

Organizers:
Luisa Damiano (University of Bergamo)
Vincent C. Müller (Anatolia College/ACT & University of Oxford)

Website: http://www.pt-ai.org/smlc/2013

In recent decades researchers in various scientific domains have been working intensely on procedures directed to exploring life and cognition in a “synthetic” way, i.e. through modeling in artificial systems. Research on biological and cognitive processes is thus been increasingly based on implementations in “software” (simulations), “hardware” (robots) and “wetware” (chemical systems) used as scientific models of the processes in question. This scientific development is often seen as the emergence of a new general methodology, a “synthetic methodology”, slated to become a dominant force in science. This synthetic methodology poses a challenge for both science itself and the philosophy of science: to define the possibilities, the limits, and the ways of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition, and its relevance for biological, behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences.

The workshop “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” will tackle this challenge by creating a strongly interdisciplinary forum that can formulate and address these fundamental questions. The workshop brings together pioneers of the synthetic exploration of life and cognition from different scientific domains (computer science, synthetic biology, cognitive, developmental, social robotics…), and invites them to discuss with philosophers and other specialists studying this emerging form of scientific investigation.

Invited speakers

  • Minoru Asada, Osaka University, Japan
  • Angelo Cangelosi, University of Plymouth, UK
  • Luciano Fadiga, University of Ferrara, Italy
  • Stuart Kauffman, University of Calgary, Canada
  • Pier Luigi Luisi, University of Rome Three, Italy
  • Giorgio Metta, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy
  • Giulio Sandini, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy
  • Ricard Solé, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain

Call for Papers

The SMLC 2013 workshop adopts an “Open Questions” format. – This means that the SMLC 2013 call for papers contains a list of questions on the synthetic modeling of life and cognition formulated by members of the Program Committee and other selected specialists on the basis of their expertise and in accordance with the topics of the workshop.

Deadline: 30.06.2013

Complete Call for Papers: http://www.pt-ai.org/smlc/2013/calls

 

Call for Papers

Workshop “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” (SMLC 2013)

12-14th September 2013, University of Bergamo, Italy

Organizers:

Luisa Damiano (University of Bergamo)

Vincent C. Müller (Anatolia College/ACT & University of Oxford)

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.PT-AI.ORG/SMLC/2013

In recent decades researchers in various scientific domains have been working intensely on procedures directed to exploring life and cognition in a “synthetic” way, i.e. through modeling in artificial systems. Research on biological and cognitive processes is thus been increasingly based on implementations in “software” (simulations), “hardware” (robots) and “wetware” (chemical systems) used as scientific models of the processes in question. This scientific development is often seen as the emergence of a new general methodology, a “synthetic methodology”, slated to become a dominant force in science. This synthetic methodology poses a challenge for both science itself and the philosophy of science: to define the possibilities, the limits, and the ways of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition, and its relevance for biological, behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences.

The workshop “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” will tackle this challenge by creating a strongly interdisciplinary forum that can formulate and address these fundamental questions. The workshop brings together pioneers of the synthetic exploration of life and cognition from different scientific domains (computer science, synthetic biology, cognitive, developmental, social robotics…), and invites them to discuss with philosophers and other specialists studying this emerging form of scientific investigation.

Invited speakers

  • Minoru Asada, Osaka University, Japan
  • Angelo Cangelosi, University of Plymouth, UK
  • Luciano Fadiga, University of Ferrara, Italy
  • Stuart Kauffman, University of Calgary, Canada
  • Pier Luigi Luisi, University of Rome Three, Italy
  • Giorgio Metta, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy
  • Giulio Sandini, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy
  • Ricard Solé, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain

Sponsors

  • Università degli studi di Bergamo, Italy
  • Research Center for Ars Vivendi at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
  • EUCog, European Network for the Advancement of Artificial Cognitive Systems, Interaction and Robotics

 

Call for Papers

The SMLC 2013 workshop adopts an “Open Questions” format. – This means that the SMLC 2013 call for papers contains a list of questions on the synthetic modeling of life and cognition formulated by members of the Program Committee and other selected specialists on the basis of their expertise and in accordance with the topics of the workshop.

The SMLC 2013 workshop questions are cutting-edge open questions defining the agenda of the nascent  interdisciplinary community dedicated to support the reflected and cooperative development of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition.

We welcome abstracts presenting and critically supporting original approaches directed to tackle the issues defined by the questions, and able to stimulate discussions and the emergence of new research lines in the interdisciplinary community created by the workshop.

The list of the SMLC 2013 workshop open questions can be found below. The questions are divided in three groups on the basis of their contents, and each question has an ID number.

We invite specialists from all the different research fields involved in this highly interdisciplinary forum to submit abstracts. In particular we welcome researchers from biology, synthetic biology, computational biology, AL, cognitive sciences, sciences of complex systems, computer sciences, AI, cognitive robotics, developmental robotics, social robotics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, philosophy of cognitive science, epistemology.

The Program Committee will select the papers to be presented at the workshop as talks through a double-blind peer review process.

We are planning to publish proceedings of the conference with a reputed publisher.

Information on how to prepare your abstract(s):

Each abstract should be anonymised for blind review and should include:

– the ID number and the short version of the question you are addressing;

–  the title of your contribution;

–  a text of up to 1000 words (excl. references) in a PDF;

–  a short abstract of up to 150 words.

Deadline: 30.06.2013

Submission at: https://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=smlc2013

Latest Information at http://www.pt-ai.org/smlc/2013/paper-submission

For any further information, please do not hesitate to contact the organizers.

Thank you for contributing to this emergent research area!

SMLC 2013: Open Questions

This is the list of questions on the synthetic modeling of life and cognition, formulated by members of the Program Committee and other selected specialists on the basis of their expertise and in accordance with the topics of the workshop.

a) Synthetic exploration of life 

(1) What are the possibilities and the limits of the synthetic study of the origins of life?

(2) Aiming at a universal biology: what can be the contribution of the synthetic methodology?

(3) Does the synthetic modeling of life need teleology?

(4) How can we test for artificial life?

b) Synthetic exploration of cognition

(5) What can synthetic biology offer to the study of cognition?

(6) What is the role of embodiment in the synthetic exploration of cognition?

(7) How can one build an agent aware of its environment?

(8) How can we model conscious experience?

(9) The extended mind thesis: can it be explored synthetically?

c) Possibilities, limits, ways and impacts of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition:

(10) The “sciences of the artificial” and the “sciences of the natural”: How can we guarantee positive  interaction?

(11) What are the characteristics and roles of synthetic models?

(12) Do different forms of the synthetic modeling have different explanatory powers?

(13) Which levels of abstraction are appropriate in the synthetic modeling of life and cognition?

(14) What are the impacts of the synthetic methodology on the dichotomies ‘science/engineering’, and ‘artificial/natural’?

(15) The synthetic methodology: What are the environmental and social impacts?

 

Explanations of the open questions on

http://www.pt-ai.org/smlc/2013/open-questions

Call for Papers

Workshop “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” (SMLC 2013)

12-14th September 2013, University of Bergamo, Italy

Organizers:

Luisa Damiano (University of Bergamo)

Vincent C. Müller (Anatolia College/ACT & University of Oxford)

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.PT-AI.ORG/SMLC/2013

In recent decades researchers in various scientific domains have been working intensely on procedures directed to exploring life and cognition in a “synthetic” way, i.e. through modeling in artificial systems. Research on biological and cognitive processes is thus been increasingly based on implementations in “software” (simulations), “hardware” (robots) and “wetware” (chemical systems) used as scientific models of the processes in question. This scientific development is often seen as the emergence of a new general methodology, a “synthetic methodology”, slated to become a dominant force in science. This synthetic methodology poses a challenge for both science itself and the philosophy of science: to define the possibilities, the limits, and the ways of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition, and its relevance for biological, behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences.

The workshop “Synthetic Modeling of Life and Cognition: Open Questions” will tackle this challenge by creating a strongly interdisciplinary forum that can formulate and address these fundamental questions. The workshop brings together pioneers of the synthetic exploration of life and cognition from different scientific domains (computer science, synthetic biology, cognitive, developmental, social robotics…), and invites them to discuss with philosophers and other specialists studying this emerging form of scientific investigation.

Invited speakers

  • Minoru Asada, Osaka University, Japan
  • Angelo Cangelosi, University of Plymouth, UK
  • Luciano Fadiga, University of Ferrara, Italy
  • Stuart Kauffman, University of Calgary, Canada
  • Pier Luigi Luisi, University of Rome Three, Italy
  • Giorgio Metta, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy
  • Giulio Sandini, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy
  • Ricard Solé, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain

Sponsors

  • Università degli studi di Bergamo, Italy
  • Research Center for Ars Vivendi at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
  • EUCog, European Network for the Advancement of Artificial Cognitive Systems, Interaction and Robotics

 

Call for Papers

The SMLC 2013 workshop adopts an “Open Questions” format. – This means that the SMLC 2013 call for papers contains a list of questions on the synthetic modeling of life and cognition formulated by members of the Program Committee and other selected specialists on the basis of their expertise and in accordance with the topics of the workshop.

The SMLC 2013 workshop questions are cutting-edge open questions defining the agenda of the nascent  interdisciplinary community dedicated to support the reflected and cooperative development of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition.

We welcome abstracts presenting and critically supporting original approaches directed to tackle the issues defined by the questions, and able to stimulate discussions and the emergence of new research lines in the interdisciplinary community created by the workshop.

The list of the SMLC 2013 workshop open questions can be found below. The questions are divided in three groups on the basis of their contents, and each question has an ID number.

We invite specialists from all the different research fields involved in this highly interdisciplinary forum to submit abstracts. In particular we welcome researchers from biology, synthetic biology, computational biology, AL, cognitive sciences, sciences of complex systems, computer sciences, AI, cognitive robotics, developmental robotics, social robotics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, philosophy of cognitive science, epistemology.

The Program Committee will select the papers to be presented at the workshop as talks through a double-blind peer review process.

We are planning to publish proceedings of the conference with a reputed publisher.

Information on how to prepare your abstract(s):

Each abstract should be anonymised for blind review and should include:

– the ID number and the short version of the question you are addressing;

–  the title of your contribution;

–  a text of up to 1000 words (excl. references) in a PDF;

–  a short abstract of up to 150 words.

Deadline: 30.06.2013

Submission at: https://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=smlc2013

Latest Information at http://www.pt-ai.org/smlc/2013/paper-submission

For any further information, please do not hesitate to contact the organizers.

Thank you for contributing to this emergent research area!

SMLC 2013: Open Questions

This is the list of questions on the synthetic modeling of life and cognition, formulated by members of the Program Committee and other selected specialists on the basis of their expertise and in accordance with the topics of the workshop.

a) Synthetic exploration of life 

(1) What are the possibilities and the limits of the synthetic study of the origins of life?

(2) Aiming at a universal biology: what can be the contribution of the synthetic methodology?

(3) Does the synthetic modeling of life need teleology?

(4) How can we test for artificial life?

b) Synthetic exploration of cognition

(5) What can synthetic biology offer to the study of cognition?

(6) What is the role of embodiment in the synthetic exploration of cognition?

(7) How can one build an agent aware of its environment?

(8) How can we model conscious experience?

(9) The extended mind thesis: can it be explored synthetically?

c) Possibilities, limits, ways and impacts of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition:

(10) The “sciences of the artificial” and the “sciences of the natural”: How can we guarantee positive  interaction?

(11) What are the characteristics and roles of synthetic models?

(12) Do different forms of the synthetic modeling have different explanatory powers?

(13) Which levels of abstraction are appropriate in the synthetic modeling of life and cognition?

(14) What are the impacts of the synthetic methodology on the dichotomies ‘science/engineering’, and ‘artificial/natural’?

(15) The synthetic methodology: What are the environmental and social impacts?

 

Explanations of the open questions on

http://www.pt-ai.org/smlc/2013/open-questions

“Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience” – IAS-Research Seminar by Mike Beaton“Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience” – IAS-Research Seminar by Mike Beaton“Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience” – IAS-Research Seminar by Mike Beaton

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Next Tuesday, May 28th, remember: at 11am, Mike Beaton.

Title: Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience

Abstract: The sensorimotor account of experience has arguably not lived up to its early promise. I suggest that this is because a full-blown sensorimotor account needs to reject an assumption shared by most consciousness researchers, namely that first person experience corresponds to processes in the head. I argue instead that when we are experiencing an object or property in the world, the experienced object is literally part of the subjective experience. This is a form of direct realism. The sensorimotor account shows us (in ways which can be made highly analytic and mathematical) what objects are, such that we may enact them, and what experience is, such that it may directly, constitutively involve these external objects. This externalist account of experience matches our first-person phenomenology much better than the standard, internalist view; it also makes it much clearer how we can have genuine knowledge of the external world. Action-based views of perception, such as this one, should respond to apparently problematic cases such as locked-in syndrome, not by referring to covert action, but rather by referring to counterfactual links to overt action (this use of counterfactuals is completely normal in science). Direct realist views should respond to arguments from illusion by noting that the detailed flow of subjective experience is different when we are really encountering an object, and when we only seem to be. Brain dynamics remain a crucial enabling part of experience, but not the only part; experience itself is the ongoing, meaningful relationship between subject and world.Next Tuesday, May 28th, remember: at 11am, Mike Beaton.

Title: Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience

Abstract: The sensorimotor account of experience has arguably not lived up to its early promise. I suggest that this is because a full-blown sensorimotor account needs to reject an assumption shared by most consciousness researchers, namely that first person experience corresponds to processes in the head. I argue instead that when we are experiencing an object or property in the world, the experienced object is literally part of the subjective experience. This is a form of direct realism. The sensorimotor account shows us (in ways which can be made highly analytic and mathematical) what objects are, such that we may enact them, and what experience is, such that it may directly, constitutively involve these external objects. This externalist account of experience matches our first-person phenomenology much better than the standard, internalist view; it also makes it much clearer how we can have genuine knowledge of the external world. Action-based views of perception, such as this one, should respond to apparently problematic cases such as locked-in syndrome, not by referring to covert action, but rather by referring to counterfactual links to overt action (this use of counterfactuals is completely normal in science). Direct realist views should respond to arguments from illusion by noting that the detailed flow of subjective experience is different when we are really encountering an object, and when we only seem to be. Brain dynamics remain a crucial enabling part of experience, but not the only part; experience itself is the ongoing, meaningful relationship between subject and world.Next Tuesday, May 28th, remember: at 11am, Mike Beaton.

Title: Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience

Abstract: The sensorimotor account of experience has arguably not lived up to its early promise. I suggest that this is because a full-blown sensorimotor account needs to reject an assumption shared by most consciousness researchers, namely that first person experience corresponds to processes in the head. I argue instead that when we are experiencing an object or property in the world, the experienced object is literally part of the subjective experience. This is a form of direct realism. The sensorimotor account shows us (in ways which can be made highly analytic and mathematical) what objects are, such that we may enact them, and what experience is, such that it may directly, constitutively involve these external objects. This externalist account of experience matches our first-person phenomenology much better than the standard, internalist view; it also makes it much clearer how we can have genuine knowledge of the external world. Action-based views of perception, such as this one, should respond to apparently problematic cases such as locked-in syndrome, not by referring to covert action, but rather by referring to counterfactual links to overt action (this use of counterfactuals is completely normal in science). Direct realist views should respond to arguments from illusion by noting that the detailed flow of subjective experience is different when we are really encountering an object, and when we only seem to be. Brain dynamics remain a crucial enabling part of experience, but not the only part; experience itself is the ongoing, meaningful relationship between subject and world.

Second Retecog Workshop 2013: Interaction Second Retecog Workshop 2013: Interaction Second Retecog Workshop 2013: Interaction

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We are glad to announce the Second official Retecog Workshop on Interaction will take place 17-18 of January 2013 at the Paraninfo Building of the University of Zaragoza, Spain. Many members of IAS-Research will attend the workshop as participants, organizers or invited speakers.

Nos complace anunciar el Segundo Workshop de la red Retecog.Net centrado en la Interacción como tema principal y que tendrá lugar del 17 al 18 de Enero en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Zaragoza. Varios integrantes de IAS-Research estarán presentes en el workshop, como participantes, organizadores y conferenciantes invitados.

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The Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life – IAS-Research Talk by Randall BeerThe Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life – IAS-Research Talk by Randall BeerThe Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life – IAS-Research Talk by Randall Beer

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Prof. Randall D. Beer (Cognitive Science Program, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, USA) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “The Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life” on Tuesday the 15th January 2013 at 11.00am at B14 Room at the Carlos Santamaría Building. Prof. Randall D. Beer (Cognitive Science Program, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, USA) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “The Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life” on Tuesday the 15th January 2013 at 11.00am at B14 Room at the Carlos Santamaría Building. Prof. Randall D. Beer (Cognitive Science Program, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, USA) will be giving an IAS-Research Talk entitled “The Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life” on Tuesday the 15th January 2013 at 11.00am at B14 Room at the Carlos Santamaría Building. Continue reading →