Thursday February 15 at 18:00 in Centro Carlos Santamaria room 4. The talk will
be hybrid. If you want to participate, please contact amontf94@gmail.com

ABSTRACT ES: Desde sus inicios, las técnicas de des-extinción han sido objeto de numerosos debates, entre ellos, el relativo a la terminología y formas de divulgación mediante las cuales estas se presentan. En 2016, un informe de evaluación de la IUCN advertía que la terminología utilizada resultaba engañosa, pues parecía prometer, en contraste con las capacidades reales de estas técnicas, la recuperación de especies extintas originales. A su vez, conservacionistas e investigadores críticos con la des-extinción, como Campagna et al. (2017), advertían de los peligros de la terminología y de la desinformación, ideas erróneas y expectativas irreales que podía suscitar. La investigación que llevamos a cabo participa en dicho debate y examina el impacto de la divulgación científica de la des-extinción y su terminología en el público lego, así como sobre los juicios e ideas que generan, destacando las implicaciones de estas en algunos de los temas que más preocupan a conservacionistas y expertos. Para ello, llevamos a cabo un experimento que contó con la participación de 200 sujetos divididos en 3 condiciones experimentales. Se diseñaron 3 textos susceptibles de ser comparados, uno para cada condición, entre los cuales la variable principal era la terminología utilizada. Algunos de los datos obtenidos indicaron (1)- que la terminología típicamente utilizada para presentar las técnicas de des-extinción tiende a desinformar a los sujetos e (2)- influir en el apoyo a la des-extinción; también descubrimos (3)- que existe un optimismo hipertrofiado sobre la des-extinción entre el público lego si comparamos sus opiniones con las de los expertos (Valdez et al., 2019). Finalmente, interpretamos los resultados obtenidos y sus implicaciones epistemológicas y planteamos las hipótesis por las que puedan discurrir futuras investigaciones.

ABSTRACT EN: Since their inception, de-extinction techniques have been the subject of much debate, including the terminology and forms of communication through which they are presented. In 2016, an IUCN report warned that the terminology used was misleading, as it seemed to promise, in contrast to the actual capabilities of these techniques, that the recovery of the original extinct species was possible. At the same time, some conservationists and researchers critical of de-extinction, as Campagna et al. (2017), warned of the dangers of this form of communication and the misinformation, misconceptions and unrealistic expectations it could lead to. The research we are carrying out engages in this debate and examines the impact of scientific communication about de-extinction and its terminology on the lay public, as well as on the judgements they generate, highlighting and examining its epistemological aspects. To this end, we conducted a survey in which 200 subjects were divided into 3 experimental conditions and required to read a text about de-extinction and then answer a questionnaire. We designed 3 similar texts, one for each condition, among which the principal variable was the terminology used. Some of the data obtained indicated (1)- that terminology typically used to present de-extinction techniques tends to misinform subjects and (2)- encourage support for de-extinction; we also found out (3)- that there is a hypertrophied optimism about de-extinction among the lay public if we compare their opinions with those of the experts (Valdez et al., 2019). We will present these results and analyze their epistemological consequences.

Thursday February 8 at 18:00 in Centro Carlos Santamaria room 5. The talk will be hybrid. If you want to participate, please contact amontf94@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: The idea that the languages we speak exert a differential influence on our cognition and behaviour, also known as the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, has experienced a remarkable resurgence in the last thirty years. There are compelling reasons to expect a theoretical convergence between these new findings and the enactive approach. However, some important theoretical obstacles remain. The argument explores these points of contact and divergence along the two premises into which linguistic relativity (LR) is usually divided: (a) the claim that language affects cognition and (b) the claim that the world’s languages differ in non-trivial ways. On the one hand, the enactive approach articulates an explicit theory of the first claim that goes beyond most contemporary research on LR, which remains highly tentative on this premise and anchored in classical cognitivist assumptions. On the other hand, the enactive approach is still to fully engage with the second claim of LR. Two difficulties are identified: the concept of ‘languaging’, central to post-cognitivist accounts of language, is in tension with the foundations of LR. At the same time, the bodily aspects of cognition have often been regarded as an antirelativistic constraint that seemingly diminishes the import of LR. Our proposal identifies the trade-offs required of both fields to further the interdisciplinary dialogue between them.

Thursday 18 January at 09:00. The event will be online. If you want to participate, please contact amontf94@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Cognition stands as one of the most formidable challenges in scientific inquiry. Living organisms exhibit behaviour teetering on the precipice of chaos. The Free Energy Principle (FEP) has been proposed as a pertinent approach to apprehending cognition. Conventional discourse on the FEP characterises the brain as a predictive apparatus. Instead, I posit that while predictive coding is a valuable tool for deciphering the conduct of complex systems, living systems do not function as detached computational prognosticators. Given their dual status as operationally closed and open systems, they exist in a state of delicacy, fostering an unbroken and pivotal interplay with their surroundings. This state of affairs, amenable to scientific explication through the FEP, provides a nuanced understanding of cognition within living systems.

Thursday January 11 starting at 11:00 in Centro Carlos Santamaria room 5. The workshop will be hybrid. If you want to participate, please contact amontf94@gmail.com

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) and associated approaches such as predictive coding/processing and active inference have grown immensely in popularity in the last decade or so. With a grand unifying ambition, the FEP is said to underlie quantum and classical mechanics, biology, cognitive science, and sociology. But its statistical method and dense mathematics make the philosophical implications often difficult to follow for outsiders. To bring people up to speed on the basics, Thomas van Es and Miguel Aguilera will be presenting introductory materials.

11.00 – 13.00 Philosophical introduction to the FEP by Thomas van Es

13.00 – 15.00 lunch break

15.00 – 17.00 Critical examination of the mathematics of the FEP by Miguel Aguilera

Thursday 14 December at 17:30 in Centro Carlos Santamaría, room 3. The talk will be hybrid. If you want to participate, please contact amontf94@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Este seminario se adentra en la filosofía de la biología reproductiva, presentando un marco organísmico y relacional. Específicamente, se trata el concepto de rasgo reproductivo, discutiendo su relevancia para las ciencias biológicas, los criterios empleados para su individuación y las posibilidades epistémicas que permite. Se expone la conceptualización adaptacionista y funcional de los rasgos reproductivos, entendidas como estrategias reproductivas para incrementar el fitness, señalando algunas de sus problemas y limitaciones a la hora de clasificar y explicar la diversidad en la reproducción. Proponemos, después, el concepto de carácter reproductivo organísmico y relacional, que pone el foco en las relaciones y da cuenta de la dimensión material y de desarrollo al tiempo que integra una visión funcional y reconoce rasgos no meramente morfológicos. Se explora cómo estos caracteres están integrados y su interacción, no solo dentro de un organismo, sino entre organismos, brindando una comprensión más profunda de los procesos reproductivos y sus conexiones en la naturaleza. Finalmente se esbozan los aspectos operacionales de esta propuesta para clasificar y explicar la evolución de los rasgos reproductivos y se discute por qué esta aproximación no es reducible a las anteriormente presentadas.

On May 4th, 2023 4pm. Centro Carlos Santamaria, Room 1. The talk will be hybrid, to participate remotely contact andrea.gambarotto@uclouvain.be

Abstract: Since its inception in the 1990s, the enactive approach has grown into a vibrant framework for understanding the mind and its entanglement in biological processes, embodiment, agency, sensorimotor interactions, sociality and language, based on an organizational, dynamical, and non-representational approach centred around the concept of autonomy. Yet, despite significant progress, the characteristically human capacity to reason about what do to – a capacity hailed especially by classical approaches to which enaction was proposed as an alternative – remains to be explained in enactive terms. This explanatory lack is pressing not only in view of vindicating enaction as a new paradigm in the cognitive sciences. It is also important because dominant views both in philosophy and cognitive science continue to affirm a conception of practical reasoning which is individualistic and modelled on theoretical reasoning. However, research from various disciplines suggests that both these tendencies stand in the way of an accurate conception of practical reasoning, one that instead begins with a conception of the practical (action) and firmly places this conception in relation to the social nature of reasoning practices. I will argue that the enactive approach is in a promising position to develop a scientifically informed and philosophically illuminating account of practical reasoning which recognizes its essentially practical and social dimension. In particular, the recent enactive proposals of sensorimotor autonomy and agency, on the one hand, and of participatory sense-making and linguistic bodies, on the other, scaffold a rich conceptual space in which to develop an enactive account of practical reasoning. However, many steps towards this lofty goal remain to be taken. In particular, I will point out that what is missing from the enactive toolkit is a conception of practical inference and action explanation and justification. Expanding on enactive and related proposals, I try to sketch how an embodied account of these notions might be developed by attending to how the explanatory structure of action is laid bare and shaped through the dynamics of social interaction. My main aim, however, is not to articulate, but to motivate an enactive approach to practical reasoning, and to bring out some of its challenges and implications, to be addressed in future research.

Abstract. Transness has become a hot topic. The political work of the trans depathologization movement and allies, and trans* activists in other fields, has been accompanied by a growing, yet insufficient legal recognition of trans* people’s rights, and by a proliferation of neuroscientific and neurobiological studies on trans* identities. Following the historical trend of the scientific hunt for brain differences related to sex-gender, sexual orientation, and race, in the last three decades, particular emphasis has been placed on the search for brain differences between trans* and cis people. The idea of the existence of distinctive neurobiological traits of trans* people has social, political, legal, and medical implications. This makes the analysis of neurobiological accounts on trans* identities a relevant and timely task, even more, in this context of the rise of essentialisms, where different conceptions on sex-gender identities are in contention.   

In this talk I rise two claims: 1) The idea of two brain types, the trans brain and the cis brain, is highly problematic. 2) The question regarding embodied trans* identities is a complex one, which cannot be reduced to neurobiological factors, nor to neurobiological causes. In doing so, I critically analyze three main neurobiological theories on trans* identities to date: the neurobiological theory about the origin of gender dysphoria, the neurodevelopmental cortical hypothesis, and the alternative hypothesis of self-referential thinking and body perception. This critical review is carried out considering feminist and trans* neuroscientific, biological, philosophical, and political developments, focusing its attention on three main elements: the issue of (de)pathologization, the idea of the trans brain, and the etiology of trans* identities. Highlighting the differences and convergences among the three hypotheses examined regarding the three main issues at stake, I problematize the depictions of the trans brain departing from the findings and conceptualizations of the paradigm shifting brain mosaicism. I also challenge the biological deterministic framework in which the etiology of trans* identities is inscribed from a dynamic processual entanglement perspective. Finally, I question the complete departure of the neurobiological discourse from a pathologizing framework.     

Abstract: Change is the fundamental idea of evolution. Explaining the extraordinary biological change we see written in the history of genomes and fossil beds is the primary occupation of the evolutionary biologist. Yet it is a surprising fact that for the majority of evolutionary research, we have rarely studied how evolution typically unfolds in nature, in changing ecological environments, over space and time. While ecology played a major role in the eventual acceptance of the population genetic viewpoint of evolution in the synthetic era (circa 1918-1956), it held a lesser role in the development of evolutionary theory until the 1980s, when we began to systematically study the evolutionary dynamics of natural populations in space and time. As a result, early evolutionary theory was initially constructed in an abstract vacuum that was unrepresentative of evolution in nature. The subtle synthesis between ecology with evolutionary biology (eco-evo synthesis) over the past 40 years has progressed our knowledge of natural selection dynamics as they are found in nature, thus revealing how natural selection varies in strength, direction, form, and, more surprisingly, level of biological organization. Natural selection can no longer be reduced to lower levels of biological organization (i.e., individuals, selfish genes) over shorter timescales but should be expanded to include adaptation at higher levels and over longer timescales. Long-term and/or emergent evolutionary phenomena, such as multilevel selection or evolvability, have thus become tenable concepts within an evolutionary biology that embraces ecological and spatiotemporal change. As a result, evolutionary biology is currently suspended at an intermediate stage of scientific progress that calls for the organization of all the recent knowledge revealed by the eco-evo synthesis into a coherent and unified theoretical framework. This is where recent advancements in the philosophy of biology can be of particular use, acting as a bridge between the subdisciplines of biology and inventing new theoretical strategies to organize and accommodate the recent knowledge. Philosophers have recommended transitioning away from outdated philosophies that were originally derived from physics within the philosophical zeitgeist of logical positivism (i.e., monism, reductionism, and monocausation) and toward a distinct philosophy of biology that can capture the natural complexity of multifaceted biological systems within diverse ecosystems—one that embraces the emerging philosophies of pluralism, emergence, and multicausality. Therefore, I see recent advances in ecology, evolutionary biology, and the philosophy of biology as laying the groundwork for another major biological synthesis, what I refer to as the Second Synthesis because, in many respects, it is analogous to the aims and outcomes of the first major biological synthesis (but is notably distinct from the inorganic movement known as the extended evolutionary synthesis). With the general development of a distinctive philosophy of science, biology has rightfully emerged as an autonomous science. Thus, while the first synthesis legitimized biology, the Second Synthesis autonomized biology and afforded biology its own philosophy.

Event is hybrid. To receive event link contact: andrea.gambarotto@gmail.com

To participate please contact: perezverdugo.marta@gmail.com

June, 14th 2022, at 11:30

ABSTRACT:

El Sujeto como protagonista de la filosofía moderna. La encarnación –cuerpo e individuo– teórica y práctica del sujeto: filosofías del yo creador y dispositivos de subjetivación del yo. La institucionalización del sujeto colectivo –estado y nación–: el nosotros, de substancia a utopía. El sujeto relacional: de la filosofía a las ciencias sociales, de la intersubjetividad a las subjetividades trans-individuales, de garantía del yo-sujeto a la liquidación de la deuda humanista.