Seminar 4 run by: Ezequiel Di Paolo
Keywords: functionalism, embodied turn, dynamical systems, enaction, phenomenology, sensorimotor approaches to perception, agency, nonrepresentationalism, embodiment, sense-making, individuation, normativity, F. Varela, H. Jonas, M. Merleau-Ponty, H. Dreyfus, J. Dewey, J. Piaget, G. Simondon, E. Thompson, R. Beer.
Readings:
Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), 429–452.
Further Readings:
Barandiaran, X., Rohde, M. and Di Paolo, E. A. (2009). Defining agency: individuality, normativity, asymmetry and spatio-temporality in action. Adaptive Behavior, 17, 367–386.
O’Regan, J. K., and Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 883–917.
Thompson, E. (2011). Précis of Mind in Life, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18, 10–22.
Thompson. E. and Cosmelli, D. (2011). Brain in a vat or body in a world? Brainbound versus enactive views of experience. Philosophical Topics, 39, 163–180.
Varela F. J. (1995). The re-enchantment of the concrete. Some biological ingredients for a nouvelle cognitive science. In: Steels L. and Brooks R. (eds.) The Artificial Life Route to Artificial Intelligence: Building Embodied, Situated Agents. Lawrence Erlbaum, New Haven. pp. 11–20.