Discussion with William Bechtel on “Mechanistic explanation and beyond”Discussion with William Bechtel on “Mechanistic explanation and beyond”Discussion with William Bechtel on “Mechanistic explanation and beyond”

Posted on 01/06/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Tuesday, June 2, 10.00 am.

Venue: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: William Bechtel (U. California, San Diego)

Title: Mechanistic explanation and beyond

Talk by William Bechtel: “Mechanistic explanation and beyond”Talk by William Bechtel: “Mechanistic explanation and beyond”Talk by William Bechtel: “Mechanistic explanation and beyond”

Posted on 01/06/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Monday, June 1, 11.30 am.

Venue: Multipurpose Room (Faculty of Philosophy)

Speaker: William Bechtel (U. California, San Diego)

Title: Mechanistic explanation and beyond (pdf)

IAS-Research Seminar by Nei de Freitas Nunes-Neto: “Functionality and regulation in ecological and social-ecological systems” IAS-Research Seminar by Nei de Freitas Nunes-Neto: “Functionality and regulation in ecological and social-ecological systems”IAS-Research Seminar by Nei de Freitas Nunes-Neto: “Functionality and regulation in ecological and social-ecological systems”

Posted on 06/05/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Monday, May 11, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Nei de Freitas Nunes-Neto (Federal University of Bahia, Brazil)

Title: Functionality and regulation in ecological and social-ecological systems

Abstract: In this talk, I will focus on functionality and regulation of ecological and social-ecological systems, presenting an overview of the work I’m developing along this year at IAS-Research Group. The talk will be composed of two main parts. First of all, I’ll present the organizational approach of ecological functions developed in a previous work, and a possible reformulation of it, pointing to some relevant issues, such as the distinction between primary and non-primary functions and the complex relationships between different closures of constraints associated to a given ecosystem. And, second, based on the previous discussion, I’ll discuss the topic of regulation in ecological and social-ecological systems. Along the presentation, I’ll use examples of ecological or social-ecological systems (based on the following keystone species: a bromeliad, a wild bee and a dung beetle) to illustrate the general ideas.

Talk by Sara Diani: “Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?”Talk by Sara Diani: “Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?”Talk by Sara Diani: “Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?”

Posted on 01/04/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Friday, May 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Sara Diani (Lahnhöhe Zentrum, Lahnstein, Germany)

Title: Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?

Abstract: In the clinical practice we approach diseases with a linear logic, not a complex one, focusing us on a little part of the organism, ignoring what happens in the other compartments. Anytime we try to treat a disease, we make several attempts because we don’t have a unifying and logical model that can help us to define a rational method. Our empiricism would need a consequent rational analysis of it, in order to properly analyze the results.

In other words, except for the studies done by the philosophers of medicine, we do not use a clear model of what is health and what is disease. To this aim the connection between philosophical and theoretical systemic approach to our body and its reactions, the science of complex systems, the study about networks and the “field discipline” in physics, and finally the clinical practice has been here explored.

A new model of interaction between body, environment and disease, by using the latest theories of physics and biology, and the concept of heuristic learning (based on the event and error) is proposed. The disease is triggered by environmental information (except for the genetic ones), and it is an active process, performed through the individual characteristics. Through heuristic learning the system develops its own “best response” to the information in that moment. This will follow the rules of the live organism: to maintain low entropy, the best order possible, and to use the least energy.

This idea has a central role in defining and treating the diseases.

The ratio between medical and biological paradigms with a systemic and holistic perspective could allow us to revolutionize the cures for the patient, to do more effective research to understand deeply the results with the final goal of a new, higher and wider level of medicine.

Date and time: Friday, May 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Sara Diani (Lahnhöhe Zentrum, Lahnstein, Germany)

Title: Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?

This idea has a central role in defining and treating the diseases.

Date and time: Friday, May 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Sara Diani (Lahnhöhe Zentrum, Lahnstein, Germany)

Title: Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?

This idea has a central role in defining and treating the diseases.

Talk by Marcella Faria: CELL-MATRIX ADHESION COMPLEXES AND THEIR DYNAMIC ASSEMBLY: THE POETICS OF CELL ATTACHMENTTalk by Marcella Faria: CELL-MATRIX ADHESION COMPLEXES AND THEIR DYNAMIC ASSEMBLY: THE POETICS OF CELL ATTACHMENTTalk by Marcella Faria: CELL-MATRIX ADHESION COMPLEXES AND THEIR DYNAMIC ASSEMBLY: THE POETICS OF CELL ATTACHMENT

Posted on 01/04/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Monday, April 27th, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Marcella Faria, Center For Applied Toxinology ,São Paulo

Title: CELL-MATRIX ADHESION COMPLEXES AND THEIR DYNAMIC ASSEMBLY: THE POETICS OF CELL ATTACHMENT

Abstract: Cell-matrix adhesion complexes (CMACs) are regions responsible for cellular attachment to the extracellular matrix (ECM), they are mainly composed by integrins, α/β heterodimers that bind selectively different ECM components through their extracellular domains acting as receptors for this class of molecules. Upon ECM binding the cytoplasmic tails of integrins will interact with a wide range of recruited factors that regulate integrin clustering in the cell membrane; and also activate signaling pathways that will provide a physical linkage between activated integrins and the microfilament system to be remodeled during cell migration. Ultimately CMACs work as functional protein networks that dynamically connect the ECM to filamentous Actin, controlling cell migration precisely through the continual rearrangement of both ECM adhesion, and Actin polymerization. In the present work we shall examine some attempts to conceptualize “cell migration” as an emergent process developed in the recent specialized literature; they introduce the notions of hierarchic organization into levels i.e. molecular, sub-cellular and cellular and describe an informational flow of increasing complexity versus decreasing number of entities, between these levels. We shall discuss few examples of CMACs remodeling in particular physiological and pathological conditions to argue that cell migration is a process that is also organized into semiotic dimensions. Our approach will not come as an alternative to the systems biology conceptualization initially presented but as a complementary view. Beyond the syntactic level – here illustrated as specific recognition of discrete ECM protein sequences by distinct integrin heterodimers – we shall reach the semantic and pragmatic levels by bringing into light the dynamics of some “word games”, i.e. Lewis Carroll’s doublets; and magic squares. In such poetic games the synthetic transformations subjected by the words have to deal with semantic rules, but are ultimately dictated by meaning, as concrete pragmatic constrains. We will emphasize the integration of synthetics, semantics and pragmatics also for the CMACs continuous remodeling through cell migration.

Workshop with Alfred Tauber: on Identity and AutonomyWorkshop with Alfred Tauber: on Identity and AutonomyWorkshop with Alfred Tauber: on Identity and Autonomy

Posted on 01/04/2015 by Omar Garcia Zabaleta

International Workshop on Autonomy and Identity in the Biomedical Sciences

April 24th, 2015

with

Alfred I. Tauber (Boston University):

Autonomy versus Dignity: The Search for Philosophical Foundations

and

Argyris Arnellos (KLI): Constitutive self-determination in the transition from uni- to multi-cellularity

Antonio Casado (UPV/EHU): Patient autonomy: narrative or episodic?

Alvaro Moreno (UPV/EHU): Agency and multicellular identity

Venue: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room A4

Organizers: Antonio Casado and Jon Umerez (UPV/EHU)

Talk by René Zaragüeta: “Why, Willi, why? Phylogenetics and the dichotomy of trees”Talk by René Zaragüeta: “Why, Willi, why? Phylogenetics and the dichotomy of trees”Talk by René Zaragüeta: “Why, Willi, why? Phylogenetics and the dichotomy of trees”

Posted on 01/03/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Monday, April 13th, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: René Zaragüeta i Bagils (Sorbonne, Paris)

Title: “Why, Willi, why? Phylogenetics and the dichotomy of trees”

Abstract: A cladogram is usually considered as resolved when all its branching points are bifurcations. The question I ask is: Why? Why all phylogenetic methods search dichotomous trees? Is evolution, or speciation, dichotomous? I suggest that Hennig’s principle of dichotomy is theoretically grounded. Cladograms—taxa and their relationships—are the result of a Cartesian analysis, which consists of the decomposition of taxa into homologies, i.e. hypotheses of degree of identity. Now, degree of identity is best represented by a ternary relationship, where two features are more identical to each other than any is to a third one. The foundation of taxa and their relationships upon homologies thus results in an intrinsically dichotomous pattern.

I speculate that the theoretical principle of dichotomy was present in Hennig’s theory. However, somehow, Hennig “forgot” his own arguments and the justification for this part of his theory.

Finally, I draw consequences of the theoretical foundation of dichotomy: if the evolutionary process needs not to be dichotomous, in which way are phylogenetic trees phylogenetic?

Talk by Thomas Reydon: Metaphysics Naturalized? The Case of Classification in the Sciences Talk by Thomas Reydon: Metaphysics Naturalized? The Case of Classification in the Sciences Talk by Thomas Reydon: Metaphysics Naturalized? The Case of Classification in the Sciences

Posted on 01/03/2015 by Ion Arrieta

Date and time: Wednesday March 4th. 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room A4

Speaker: Thomas Reydon

Title: Metaphysics Naturalized? The Case of Classification in the Sciences

Abstract: While the topic of natural kinds has long been a focus of work in the philosophy of science, as well as in other areas of philosophy, a generally accepted account of natural kinds is still lacking. Moreover, there even is no general agreement about the kind of account that is being searched for, or about the criteria that a good account of natural kinds should meet. In response to these problems, in the philosophy of science (though not in other areas) there is a trend to move away from the metaphysics of kinds and classification and to turn to epistemological issues and questions regarding the use of kinds and classifications in various contexts. This trend fits well with the renewed interest in doing naturalistic philosophy of science and the increasing calls for bringing philosophy of science closer to scientific practice.

However, abandoning the search for a metaphysics of kinds and classifications is too quick. A metaphysical account of kinds is a crucial element of the explanation why some kinds and classifications are used in the sciences with more success than others, and some ways of grouping things turn out not to be useful at all. After all, barring cases of epistemic luck the reason for the epistemic and practical success of kinds and classifications must be that they adequately represent some aspect of the world or other. But problem for naturalistic philosophers wanting to elucidate the metaphysics of scientific kinds and classifications is whether naturalistic and practice-oriented philosophy of science can at all come up with an account of the metaphysics of kinds and classifications, rather than staying with epistemological and practical issues. Metaphysics cannot be read off from either epistemology or practice: simply examining scientific kinds and classifications and the ways in which investigators in the various areas of science employ them will not reveal their underpinnings. Thus, some a priori considerations need to enter into the picture – but a priori metaphysics is suspect from a naturalistic viewpoint.

The challenge for a naturalistic and practice-oriented metaphysics of kinds and classification, then, is to bring a priori considerations into play without rendering the account insufficiently naturalistic. In this talk I addresses this challenge and explore what a thoroughly naturalistic metaphysics of kinds and classifications should look like. I will do this by examining two core notions in the debate on kinds and classification, namely the notions of naturalness and, in particular, normativity.