Date and Time: November 30, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Roslyn M. Frank (University of Iowa) (https://uiowa.academia.edu/RoslynMFrank)

Title: A cognitive approach to the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ (elkarrekikotasuna) in Euskera: Three examples

Abstract: 

The talk begins with a brief overview of the way that ‘language’ has come to be defined as a complex adaptive system and how concepts such as distributed cognition and cultural conceptualizations are being brought to bear in order to analyze the cognitive dimensions of language, in this instance the Basque language. The role played by the sociocultural situatedness of language agents as well as language itself in the production of macro- and micro-level structure of a linguistic system is highlighted. Next, factors contributing to the stability of a linguistically instantiated schema are summarized, e.g., the notion of networking, that is, the way that mutually supporting instantiations of a schema can contribute to its stability and continuity across time. Even when the cognitive schema entrenched in the language is not consciously perceived by its speakers, the participating linguistic subsystems still provide mutual structural support for each other. As will be demonstrated, from a cognitive perspective the three subsystems that will be examined in the talk act to support each other and have contributed to the stability of the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ (elkarrekikotasuna) across time. As a bridging mechanism for the last section of the talk, the need to consider the ‘dialogic dimension’ of language is brought forward which as Stawarska (2009) has noted, involves moving beyond first-person transcendental subjectivity and the limited scope of first and third modes at the exclusion of the first-to-second person mode of interrelatedness. In the last part of the talk the way that the Basque language emphasizes the first-to-second person mode of interrelatedness and structurally incorporates the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ will be addressed. To illustrate how this schema is instantiated, three examples of subsystems that feed into the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ will be analyzed. All three of them are present in the Basque language today. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, this cognitive schema is deeply embedded in the Basque language and shows significant time-depth. Although no knowledge of Basque is required to follow the presentation, Basque speakers may discover that Euskera has some remarkable cognitive dimensions that until now have gone relatively unnoticed, not the least of which is the way that schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ contrasts with the schema of ‘monologic subjectivity’ found in languages like Spanish and English.

Selected references: 

Azkarate, M., & Altuna, P. (2001). Euskal morfologiaren historia. Donostia: Elkarlanean, S.L.

Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2014). From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 1-37. DOI 10.1007/s11097-11014-19404-11099.

De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 6, 485-507.

Frank, R. M. (2005). Shifting identities: A comparative study of Basque and Western cultural conceptualizations. Cahiers of the Association for French Language Studies, 11(2), 1-54. http://tinyurl.com/shifting-identities-in-Basque.

Frank, R. M. (2013). Body and mind in Euskara: Contrasting dialogic and monologic subjectivities. In R. Caballero-Rodríguez & J. E. Díaz Vera (Eds.), Sensuous Cognition: Explorations into Human Sentience: Imagination, (E)motion and Perception (pp. 19-51). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. http://tinyurl.com/body-and-mind-in-Euskara.

Frank, R. M. (2014). A complex adaptive systems approach to language, cultural schemas and serial metonymy: Charting the cognitive innovations of ‘fingers’ and ‘claws’ in Basque. In J. E. Díaz-Vera (Ed.), Metaphor and Metonymy through Time and Cultures: Perspectives on the Sociohistorical Linguistics of Figurative Language (pp. 65-94). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Frank, R. M. (2015a). Cultural Linguistics and the future agenda for research on language and culture. In F. Sharifian (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Language and Culture (pp. 493-512). New York/London: Routledge. http://tinyurl.com/cultural-linguistics.

Frank, R. M. (2015b). The relevance of a ‘Complex Adaptive Systems’ approach to ‘language’: A bridge for increased dialogue between the disciplines of cognitive and evolutionary linguistics. Presentation at the 13th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, July 20-26 2015, Northumbrian University, Newcastle, UK. [Invited talk at the Theme Session “Cognitive Linguistics and the Evolution of Language: Converging Perspectives”] http://tinyurl.com/CAS-ICLC-2015.

Frank, R. M., & Gontier, N. (2010). On constructing a research model for historical cognitive linguistics (HCL): Some theoretical considerations. In H. Tissari, P. Koivisto-Alanko, K. I. Allan, & M. Winter (Eds.), Historical Cognitive Linguistics (pp. 31-69). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. http://tinyurl.com/model-HCL.

Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2010). Non-representational subjectivity. In T. Fuchs, H. C. Sattel, & P. Henningsen (Eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence and Disorders (pp. 203-214). Stuttgart: Schattauer Verlag.

Maynard, S. K. (2007). Linguistic Creativity in Japanese Discourse: Exploring the Multiplicity of Self, Perspective and Voice. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Michelena, L. ([1979] 1987). Miscelánea filológica vasca IV. In L. Mitxelena (Ed.), Palabras y textos (pp. 435-463). Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco. Publicado en Fontes Linguae Vasconum XX, 33: 377-406

Moreno Cabrera, J. C. (1998). Allocutivity and voice in the Basque verb. In L. Kulikov & H. Vater (Eds.), Typology of Verbal Categories (pp. 169-178). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Naruoka, K. (2008). Expressivity of Demonstratives: A Contrastive Study in Japanese and English Discourse. Japan Women’s University.

Sharifian, F. (2009). On collective cognition and language. In H. Pishwa (Ed.), Social Cognition and Language: Expression of the Social Mind (pp. 163-180). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Sharifian, F. (2011). Cultural Conceptualizations and Language: Theoretical Framework and Applications. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Stawarska, B. (2009). Between You and I. Athens   Ohio University Press.

Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). Introduction. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, & E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enactivism: Towards a New Paradigm in Cognitive Science (pp. vii-xvii). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Date and Time: November 30, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Roslyn M. Frank (University of Iowa) (https://uiowa.academia.edu/RoslynMFrank)

Title: A cognitive approach to the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ (elkarrekikotasuna) in Euskera: Three examples

Abstract: 

The talk begins with a brief overview of the way that ‘language’ has come to be defined as a complex adaptive system and how concepts such as distributed cognition and cultural conceptualizations are being brought to bear in order to analyze the cognitive dimensions of language, in this instance the Basque language. The role played by the sociocultural situatedness of language agents as well as language itself in the production of macro- and micro-level structure of a linguistic system is highlighted. Next, factors contributing to the stability of a linguistically instantiated schema are summarized, e.g., the notion of networking, that is, the way that mutually supporting instantiations of a schema can contribute to its stability and continuity across time. Even when the cognitive schema entrenched in the language is not consciously perceived by its speakers, the participating linguistic subsystems still provide mutual structural support for each other. As will be demonstrated, from a cognitive perspective the three subsystems that will be examined in the talk act to support each other and have contributed to the stability of the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ (elkarrekikotasuna) across time. As a bridging mechanism for the last section of the talk, the need to consider the ‘dialogic dimension’ of language is brought forward which as Stawarska (2009) has noted, involves moving beyond first-person transcendental subjectivity and the limited scope of first and third modes at the exclusion of the first-to-second person mode of interrelatedness. In the last part of the talk the way that the Basque language emphasizes the first-to-second person mode of interrelatedness and structurally incorporates the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ will be addressed. To illustrate how this schema is instantiated, three examples of subsystems that feed into the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ will be analyzed. All three of them are present in the Basque language today. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, this cognitive schema is deeply embedded in the Basque language and shows significant time-depth. Although no knowledge of Basque is required to follow the presentation, Basque speakers may discover that Euskera has some remarkable cognitive dimensions that until now have gone relatively unnoticed, not the least of which is the way that schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ contrasts with the schema of ‘monologic subjectivity’ found in languages like Spanish and English.

Selected references: 

Azkarate, M., & Altuna, P. (2001). Euskal morfologiaren historia. Donostia: Elkarlanean, S.L.

Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2014). From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 1-37. DOI 10.1007/s11097-11014-19404-11099.

De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 6, 485-507.

Frank, R. M. (2005). Shifting identities: A comparative study of Basque and Western cultural conceptualizations. Cahiers of the Association for French Language Studies, 11(2), 1-54. http://tinyurl.com/shifting-identities-in-Basque.

Frank, R. M. (2013). Body and mind in Euskara: Contrasting dialogic and monologic subjectivities. In R. Caballero-Rodríguez & J. E. Díaz Vera (Eds.), Sensuous Cognition: Explorations into Human Sentience: Imagination, (E)motion and Perception (pp. 19-51). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. http://tinyurl.com/body-and-mind-in-Euskara.

Frank, R. M. (2014). A complex adaptive systems approach to language, cultural schemas and serial metonymy: Charting the cognitive innovations of ‘fingers’ and ‘claws’ in Basque. In J. E. Díaz-Vera (Ed.), Metaphor and Metonymy through Time and Cultures: Perspectives on the Sociohistorical Linguistics of Figurative Language (pp. 65-94). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Frank, R. M. (2015a). Cultural Linguistics and the future agenda for research on language and culture. In F. Sharifian (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Language and Culture (pp. 493-512). New York/London: Routledge. http://tinyurl.com/cultural-linguistics.

Frank, R. M. (2015b). The relevance of a ‘Complex Adaptive Systems’ approach to ‘language’: A bridge for increased dialogue between the disciplines of cognitive and evolutionary linguistics. Presentation at the 13th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, July 20-26 2015, Northumbrian University, Newcastle, UK. [Invited talk at the Theme Session “Cognitive Linguistics and the Evolution of Language: Converging Perspectives”] http://tinyurl.com/CAS-ICLC-2015.

Frank, R. M., & Gontier, N. (2010). On constructing a research model for historical cognitive linguistics (HCL): Some theoretical considerations. In H. Tissari, P. Koivisto-Alanko, K. I. Allan, & M. Winter (Eds.), Historical Cognitive Linguistics (pp. 31-69). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. http://tinyurl.com/model-HCL.

Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2010). Non-representational subjectivity. In T. Fuchs, H. C. Sattel, & P. Henningsen (Eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence and Disorders (pp. 203-214). Stuttgart: Schattauer Verlag.

Maynard, S. K. (2007). Linguistic Creativity in Japanese Discourse: Exploring the Multiplicity of Self, Perspective and Voice. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Michelena, L. ([1979] 1987). Miscelánea filológica vasca IV. In L. Mitxelena (Ed.), Palabras y textos (pp. 435-463). Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco. Publicado en Fontes Linguae Vasconum XX, 33: 377-406

Moreno Cabrera, J. C. (1998). Allocutivity and voice in the Basque verb. In L. Kulikov & H. Vater (Eds.), Typology of Verbal Categories (pp. 169-178). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Naruoka, K. (2008). Expressivity of Demonstratives: A Contrastive Study in Japanese and English Discourse. Japan Women’s University.

Sharifian, F. (2009). On collective cognition and language. In H. Pishwa (Ed.), Social Cognition and Language: Expression of the Social Mind (pp. 163-180). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Sharifian, F. (2011). Cultural Conceptualizations and Language: Theoretical Framework and Applications. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Stawarska, B. (2009). Between You and I. Athens   Ohio University Press.

Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). Introduction. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, & E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enactivism: Towards a New Paradigm in Cognitive Science (pp. vii-xvii). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Date and Time: November 30, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Roslyn M. Frank (University of Iowa) (https://uiowa.academia.edu/RoslynMFrank)

Title: A cognitive approach to the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ (elkarrekikotasuna) in Euskera: Three examples

Abstract: 

The talk begins with a brief overview of the way that ‘language’ has come to be defined as a complex adaptive system and how concepts such as distributed cognition and cultural conceptualizations are being brought to bear in order to analyze the cognitive dimensions of language, in this instance the Basque language. The role played by the sociocultural situatedness of language agents as well as language itself in the production of macro- and micro-level structure of a linguistic system is highlighted. Next, factors contributing to the stability of a linguistically instantiated schema are summarized, e.g., the notion of networking, that is, the way that mutually supporting instantiations of a schema can contribute to its stability and continuity across time. Even when the cognitive schema entrenched in the language is not consciously perceived by its speakers, the participating linguistic subsystems still provide mutual structural support for each other. As will be demonstrated, from a cognitive perspective the three subsystems that will be examined in the talk act to support each other and have contributed to the stability of the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ (elkarrekikotasuna) across time. As a bridging mechanism for the last section of the talk, the need to consider the ‘dialogic dimension’ of language is brought forward which as Stawarska (2009) has noted, involves moving beyond first-person transcendental subjectivity and the limited scope of first and third modes at the exclusion of the first-to-second person mode of interrelatedness. In the last part of the talk the way that the Basque language emphasizes the first-to-second person mode of interrelatedness and structurally incorporates the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ will be addressed. To illustrate how this schema is instantiated, three examples of subsystems that feed into the schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ will be analyzed. All three of them are present in the Basque language today. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, this cognitive schema is deeply embedded in the Basque language and shows significant time-depth. Although no knowledge of Basque is required to follow the presentation, Basque speakers may discover that Euskera has some remarkable cognitive dimensions that until now have gone relatively unnoticed, not the least of which is the way that schema of ‘dialogic subjectivity’ contrasts with the schema of ‘monologic subjectivity’ found in languages like Spanish and English.

Selected references: 

Azkarate, M., & Altuna, P. (2001). Euskal morfologiaren historia. Donostia: Elkarlanean, S.L.

Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2014). From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 1-37. DOI 10.1007/s11097-11014-19404-11099.

De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 6, 485-507.

Frank, R. M. (2005). Shifting identities: A comparative study of Basque and Western cultural conceptualizations. Cahiers of the Association for French Language Studies, 11(2), 1-54. http://tinyurl.com/shifting-identities-in-Basque.

Frank, R. M. (2013). Body and mind in Euskara: Contrasting dialogic and monologic subjectivities. In R. Caballero-Rodríguez & J. E. Díaz Vera (Eds.), Sensuous Cognition: Explorations into Human Sentience: Imagination, (E)motion and Perception (pp. 19-51). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. http://tinyurl.com/body-and-mind-in-Euskara.

Frank, R. M. (2014). A complex adaptive systems approach to language, cultural schemas and serial metonymy: Charting the cognitive innovations of ‘fingers’ and ‘claws’ in Basque. In J. E. Díaz-Vera (Ed.), Metaphor and Metonymy through Time and Cultures: Perspectives on the Sociohistorical Linguistics of Figurative Language (pp. 65-94). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Frank, R. M. (2015a). Cultural Linguistics and the future agenda for research on language and culture. In F. Sharifian (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Language and Culture (pp. 493-512). New York/London: Routledge. http://tinyurl.com/cultural-linguistics.

Frank, R. M. (2015b). The relevance of a ‘Complex Adaptive Systems’ approach to ‘language’: A bridge for increased dialogue between the disciplines of cognitive and evolutionary linguistics. Presentation at the 13th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, July 20-26 2015, Northumbrian University, Newcastle, UK. [Invited talk at the Theme Session “Cognitive Linguistics and the Evolution of Language: Converging Perspectives”] http://tinyurl.com/CAS-ICLC-2015.

Frank, R. M., & Gontier, N. (2010). On constructing a research model for historical cognitive linguistics (HCL): Some theoretical considerations. In H. Tissari, P. Koivisto-Alanko, K. I. Allan, & M. Winter (Eds.), Historical Cognitive Linguistics (pp. 31-69). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. http://tinyurl.com/model-HCL.

Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2010). Non-representational subjectivity. In T. Fuchs, H. C. Sattel, & P. Henningsen (Eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence and Disorders (pp. 203-214). Stuttgart: Schattauer Verlag.

Maynard, S. K. (2007). Linguistic Creativity in Japanese Discourse: Exploring the Multiplicity of Self, Perspective and Voice. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Michelena, L. ([1979] 1987). Miscelánea filológica vasca IV. In L. Mitxelena (Ed.), Palabras y textos (pp. 435-463). Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco. Publicado en Fontes Linguae Vasconum XX, 33: 377-406

Moreno Cabrera, J. C. (1998). Allocutivity and voice in the Basque verb. In L. Kulikov & H. Vater (Eds.), Typology of Verbal Categories (pp. 169-178). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Naruoka, K. (2008). Expressivity of Demonstratives: A Contrastive Study in Japanese and English Discourse. Japan Women’s University.

Sharifian, F. (2009). On collective cognition and language. In H. Pishwa (Ed.), Social Cognition and Language: Expression of the Social Mind (pp. 163-180). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Sharifian, F. (2011). Cultural Conceptualizations and Language: Theoretical Framework and Applications. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Stawarska, B. (2009). Between You and I. Athens   Ohio University Press.

Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). Introduction. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, & E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enactivism: Towards a New Paradigm in Cognitive Science (pp. vii-xvii). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Date and Time: November 9, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Francisco Vergara Silva (Institute of Biology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

Title: Evolución biocultural y filosofía de la ciencia

Abstract: 

Los estudios científicos sobre la evolución de Homo sapiens, sus parientes filogenéticos cercanos, y algunas especies biológicas cuya relación con grupos humanos concretos se intensificó al inicio del Holoceno –i.e. las múltiples especies domesticadas que sustentaron el origen de la agricultura y la configuración de sociedades jerárquicas– pasan actualmente por un momento de auge. Al tiempo que dichas investigaciones evolucionistas involucran cruces entre diversas aproximaciones metodológicas, fortaleciendo campos híbridos como la arqueogenética o la paleogenómica, la filosofía de la ciencia –en especial, la que se encuentra ligada con la teorización en biología– está tomando parte cada vez más notoria en dichas interacciones disciplinares. En esta charla trataré el caso de la teoría de construcción de nicho (TCN) cultural, en tanto espacio de confluencia de diversas comunidades y discursos, científicos y filosófico-científicos, acerca de patrones y procesos evolutivos que –en mi opinión– se acoplan sin dificultad a una noción de bioculturalidad. En complemento a esta visión de conjunto, abordaré los aspectos conceptuales de un conjunto de investigaciones sobre evolución humana, predominantemente arqueológicas, desarrolladas inicialmente en el sureste de México por especialistas norteamericanos hace aproximadamente medio siglo. En función de ambos tratamientos, argumentaré que el interés antropológico contemporáneo por la TCN(C) se explica mejor como resultado de su ‘raíz arqueológica’ y que, por tanto, diversos recursos analíticos arqueológicos actuales bien podrían enriquecer a una ‘síntesis evolutiva extendida biocultural’ en la misma medida –o aún más– que los que provienen propiamente de la biología. Esta presentación busca contribuir a discusiones sobre las afinidades disciplinares múltiples del pensamiento evolucionista contemporáneo, así como a reflexiones sobre la interacción entre ciencia y filosofía de la ciencia en los estudios académicos situados en ‘áreas bioculturales megadiversas’, como Mesoamérica.

Fecha y hora: 9 de Noviembre, lunes, 11.30 am.

Lugar: Edificio Carlos Santamaría, Sala B14

Ponente: Francisco Vergara Silva (Instituto de Biología, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

Título: Evolución biocultural y filosofía de la ciencia

Resumen: 

Los estudios científicos sobre la evolución de Homo sapiens, sus parientes filogenéticos cercanos, y algunas especies biológicas cuya relación con grupos humanos concretos se intensificó al inicio del Holoceno –i.e. las múltiples especies domesticadas que sustentaron el origen de la agricultura y la configuración de sociedades jerárquicas– pasan actualmente por un momento de auge. Al tiempo que dichas investigaciones evolucionistas involucran cruces entre diversas aproximaciones metodológicas, fortaleciendo campos híbridos como la arqueogenética o la paleogenómica, la filosofía de la ciencia –en especial, la que se encuentra ligada con la teorización en biología– está tomando parte cada vez más notoria en dichas interacciones disciplinares. En esta charla trataré el caso de la teoría de construcción de nicho (TCN) cultural, en tanto espacio de confluencia de diversas comunidades y discursos, científicos y filosófico-científicos, acerca de patrones y procesos evolutivos que –en mi opinión– se acoplan sin dificultad a una noción de bioculturalidad. En complemento a esta visión de conjunto, abordaré los aspectos conceptuales de un conjunto de investigaciones sobre evolución humana, predominantemente arqueológicas, desarrolladas inicialmente en el sureste de México por especialistas norteamericanos hace aproximadamente medio siglo. En función de ambos tratamientos, argumentaré que el interés antropológico contemporáneo por la TCN(C) se explica mejor como resultado de su ‘raíz arqueológica’ y que, por tanto, diversos recursos analíticos arqueológicos actuales bien podrían enriquecer a una ‘síntesis evolutiva extendida biocultural’ en la misma medida –o aún más– que los que provienen propiamente de la biología. Esta presentación busca contribuir a discusiones sobre las afinidades disciplinares múltiples del pensamiento evolucionista contemporáneo, así como a reflexiones sobre la interacción entre ciencia y filosofía de la ciencia en los estudios académicos situados en ‘áreas bioculturales megadiversas’, como Mesoamérica.

Date and Time: November 9, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Francisco Vergara Silva (Institute de Biology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

Title: Evolución biocultural y filosofía de la ciencia

Abstract: 

Los estudios científicos sobre la evolución de Homo sapiens, sus parientes filogenéticos cercanos, y algunas especies biológicas cuya relación con grupos humanos concretos se intensificó al inicio del Holoceno –i.e. las múltiples especies domesticadas que sustentaron el origen de la agricultura y la configuración de sociedades jerárquicas– pasan actualmente por un momento de auge. Al tiempo que dichas investigaciones evolucionistas involucran cruces entre diversas aproximaciones metodológicas, fortaleciendo campos híbridos como la arqueogenética o la paleogenómica, la filosofía de la ciencia –en especial, la que se encuentra ligada con la teorización en biología– está tomando parte cada vez más notoria en dichas interacciones disciplinares. En esta charla trataré el caso de la teoría de construcción de nicho (TCN) cultural, en tanto espacio de confluencia de diversas comunidades y discursos, científicos y filosófico-científicos, acerca de patrones y procesos evolutivos que –en mi opinión– se acoplan sin dificultad a una noción de bioculturalidad. En complemento a esta visión de conjunto, abordaré los aspectos conceptuales de un conjunto de investigaciones sobre evolución humana, predominantemente arqueológicas, desarrolladas inicialmente en el sureste de México por especialistas norteamericanos hace aproximadamente medio siglo. En función de ambos tratamientos, argumentaré que el interés antropológico contemporáneo por la TCN(C) se explica mejor como resultado de su ‘raíz arqueológica’ y que, por tanto, diversos recursos analíticos arqueológicos actuales bien podrían enriquecer a una ‘síntesis evolutiva extendida biocultural’ en la misma medida –o aún más– que los que provienen propiamente de la biología. Esta presentación busca contribuir a discusiones sobre las afinidades disciplinares múltiples del pensamiento evolucionista contemporáneo, así como a reflexiones sobre la interacción entre ciencia y filosofía de la ciencia en los estudios académicos situados en ‘áreas bioculturales megadiversas’, como Mesoamérica.

Date and Time: September 28th, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza (independent researcher)

Title: The Morality of Head Transplant

Abstract:

In 1970 Robert J. White tried to transplant the head of a monkey to the body of another monkey. He was inspired by the work of another scientist, a truly pioneer in organ transplantation: Vladimir Demikhov (1916-1998). Both White and Demikhov were ahead of their time. They devised to transplant heads, firstly in dogs (Demikhov´s milestone), then in monkeys (White´s achievement). In 2013 Sergio Canavero of the Turin Advanced Neuromodulation Group (TANG) in Italy, spoke of his plans to carry out the first human head transplantation (Canavero 2015). Thirty years after the first attempts to transplant heads in non-human animals, scientists contemplate now the first human head transplant. Spinal linkage offers now the possibility of transplanting the head and, by doing so, circunventing  many of the somatic diseases afflicting human beings. In this talk we explore the feasibility of human head transplants and highlight the ethical problems associated to.

Día y hora: 28 de septiembre, lunes, 11.30 am.

Lugar: Centro Carlos Santamaría, Sala B14

Ponente: Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza (investigador independiente)

Título: La moralidad del trasplante de cabeza

Resumen:

En 1970 Robert White intentó traspantar la cabeza de un mono al cuerpo de otro mono. Se inspiró en el trabajo de otro científico, un verdadero pionero en trasplante de órganos: Vladimir Demikhov (1916-1998). Ambos, White y Demikhov fueron adelantados a su tiempo. Ellos idearon trasplantar cabezas, en primer lugar en perros (hito de Demikhov), y luego en monos (logro de White). En 2013 Sergio Canavero del Turing Advanced Neuromodulation Group (TANG) en Italia, habló de sus planes de llevar a cabo el primer trasplante de cabeza humano (Canavero 2015). Treinta años despues de los primeros intentos de trasplante de cabeza en animales no-humanos, los científicos contemplan ahora el trasplante de cabeza en seres humanos. La fusión de la médula espinal ofrece ahora la posibilidad de trasplantar la cabeza y de este modo, superar muchas de las enfermedades somáticas que afligen a miles de personas en todo el mundo. En esta charla exploramos la viabilidad del trasplante de cabeza en seres humanos y subrayamos los problemas éticos que se derivan.

Date and Time: September 28th, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza (independent researcher)

Title: The Morality of Head Transplant

Abstract:

In 1970 Robert J. White tried to transplant the head of a monkey to the body of another monkey. He was inspired by the work of another scientist, a truly pioneer in organ transplantation: Vladimir Demikhov (1916-1998). Both White and Demikhov were ahead of their time. They devised to transplant heads, firstly in dogs (Demikhov´s milestone), then in monkeys (White´s achievement). In 2013 Sergio Canavero of the Turin Advanced Neuromodulation Group (TANG) in Italy, spoke of his plans to carry out the first human head transplantation (Canavero 2015). Thirty years after the first attempts to transplant heads in non-human animals, scientists contemplate now the first human head transplant. Spinal linkage offers now the possibility of transplanting the head and, by doing so, circunventing  many of the somatic diseases afflicting human beings. In this talk we explore the feasibility of human head transplants and highlight the ethical problems associated to.

Date and Time: September 14th, Monday, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Mª José Ferreira Ruiz (CONICET – Universidad de Buenos Aires)

Title: Information, inheritance systems and developmental resources

Abstract: 

The relation between biological inheritance and biological information
is close but tricky and unclear, and has not been directly explored.
Since the rise of molecular biology, genes have been thought of not
only as heritable units, but also as informational units. The
traditional focus put almost exclusively on genetic inheritance, and
the early introduction of the term ‘information’ to refer to genes,
may have given the impression that both properties come in a package,
as if every heritable unit were an informational one, and vice versa.
At present, we recognize other, non-genetical, inheritance systems,
but this only redoubles the confusion. A second issue concerning the
concept of information is posed by the notion of “developmental
resource” discussed by Developmental Systems theorists, among which we
count many different biological agents. Some authors have claimed that
if we admit genes -developmental resources- to be information
carriers, then the same must be said of the rest of the developmental
resources. Thus, they suggest an “informational parity” among genes
and non-genetic factors. My aim in this presentation is to addresss
the problematic aspects of these two relationships, that is, the one
between information and inheritance and the one between information
and causation. In both cases, I will argue that there are conceptual
confusions implied.

Fecha y hora: 14 de Septiembre, Lunes, 11.30 am.

Lugar: Centro Carlos Santamaría, Aula B14

Ponente: Mª José Ferreira Ruiz (CONICET – Universidad de Buenos Aires)

Título: Information, inheritance systems and developmental resources

Abstract: 

The relation between biological inheritance and biological information

is close but tricky and unclear, and has not been directly explored.

Since the rise of molecular biology, genes have been thought of not

only as heritable units, but also as informational units. The

traditional focus put almost exclusively on genetic inheritance, and

the early introduction of the term ‘information’ to refer to genes,

may have given the impression that both properties come in a package,

as if every heritable unit were an informational one, and vice versa.

At present, we recognize other, non-genetical, inheritance systems,

but this only redoubles the confusion. A second issue concerning the

concept of information is posed by the notion of “developmental

resource” discussed by Developmental Systems theorists, among which we

count many different biological agents. Some authors have claimed that

if we admit genes -developmental resources- to be information

carriers, then the same must be said of the rest of the developmental

resources. Thus, they suggest an “informational parity” among genes

and non-genetic factors. My aim in this presentation is to addresss

the problematic aspects of these two relationships, that is, the one

between information and inheritance and the one between information

and causation. In both cases, I will argue that there are conceptual

confusions implied.

Eguna eta Ordua: Irailak 14, Astelehena, 11.30tan.

Tokia: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Hizlaria: Mª José Ferreira Ruiz (CONICET – Universidad de Buenos Aires)

Titulua: Information, inheritance systems and developmental resources

Abstract: 

The relation between biological inheritance and biological information

is close but tricky and unclear, and has not been directly explored.

Since the rise of molecular biology, genes have been thought of not

only as heritable units, but also as informational units. The

traditional focus put almost exclusively on genetic inheritance, and

the early introduction of the term ‘information’ to refer to genes,

may have given the impression that both properties come in a package,

as if every heritable unit were an informational one, and vice versa.

At present, we recognize other, non-genetical, inheritance systems,

but this only redoubles the confusion. A second issue concerning the

concept of information is posed by the notion of “developmental

resource” discussed by Developmental Systems theorists, among which we

count many different biological agents. Some authors have claimed that

if we admit genes -developmental resources- to be information

carriers, then the same must be said of the rest of the developmental

resources. Thus, they suggest an “informational parity” among genes

and non-genetic factors. My aim in this presentation is to addresss

the problematic aspects of these two relationships, that is, the one

between information and inheritance and the one between information

and causation. In both cases, I will argue that there are conceptual

confusions implied.

Date and time: July 2, Thursday,11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Laura Nuño de la Rosa

Title: Computing evo-devo. Mapping the dynamics and conceptual structure of the evolvability research front

Abstract: Although evolutionary developmental biology is widely seen as a well established discipline, there is still no agreement on the impact of the introduction of development into the general structure of evolutionary theory. It has recently been argued that philosophy of biology should shift the emphasis from theories to epistemic goals in evolutionary biology, and particularly in evo-devo (Brigandt 2010; Love 2010). In this view, the identity of evo-devo as a discipline does not lay in being a theory, but derives from the pursuit of specific epistemic goals, such as the explanation of evolvability, evolutionary novelty or homology. On the other hand, the development of big data–based approaches and computational analytical methods is revolutionizing the field of the history  of science (Laubichler, Maienschein, and Renn 2013).  In this paper, I will apply these two new approaches to the history and philosophy of science to the study of evolvability, a research topic which is usually taken to be a cornerstone of evo-devo and, more generally, of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (Pigliucci 2008).

Brigandt, I. 2010. “Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology.” Erkenntnis 73 (3): 295–311.

Chen, C. 2006. “CiteSpace II: Detecting and Visualizing Emerging Trends and Transient Patterns in Scientific Literature.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 57 (3): 359–77.

Galison, P. 1999. “Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief.” The Science Studies Reader, 137–60.

Laubichler, M. D., J. Maienschein, and J. Renn. 2013. “Computational Perspectives in the History of Science: To the Memory of Peter Damerow.” Isis 104 (1): 119–30.

Love, A. C. 2010. “Rethinking the Structure of Evolutionary Theory for an Extended Synthesis.” In Evolution – the Extended Synthesis, edited by M. Pigliucci and G. B. Müller, 403–41. The MIT Press.

Pigliucci, M. 2008. “Opinion – Is Evolvability Evolvable?” NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 9 (1): 75–82.

Date and time: July 2, Thursday,11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Laura Nuño de la Rosa

Title: Computing evo-devo. Mapping the dynamics and conceptual structure of the evolvability research front

Abstract: Although evolutionary developmental biology is widely seen as a well established discipline, there is still no agreement on the impact of the introduction of development into the general structure of evolutionary theory. It has recently been argued that philosophy of biology should shift the emphasis from theories to epistemic goals in evolutionary biology, and particularly in evo-devo (Brigandt 2010; Love 2010). In this view, the identity of evo-devo as a discipline does not lay in being a theory, but derives from the pursuit of specific epistemic goals, such as the explanation of evolvability, evolutionary novelty or homology. On the other hand, the development of big data–based approaches and computational analytical methods is revolutionizing the field of the history  of science (Laubichler, Maienschein, and Renn 2013).  In this paper, I will apply these two new approaches to the history and philosophy of science to the study of evolvability, a research topic which is usually taken to be a cornerstone of evo-devo and, more generally, of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (Pigliucci 2008).

Brigandt, I. 2010. “Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology.” Erkenntnis 73 (3): 295–311.

Chen, C. 2006. “CiteSpace II: Detecting and Visualizing Emerging Trends and Transient Patterns in Scientific Literature.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 57 (3): 359–77.

Galison, P. 1999. “Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief.” The Science Studies Reader, 137–60.

Laubichler, M. D., J. Maienschein, and J. Renn. 2013. “Computational Perspectives in the History of Science: To the Memory of Peter Damerow.” Isis 104 (1): 119–30.

Love, A. C. 2010. “Rethinking the Structure of Evolutionary Theory for an Extended Synthesis.” In Evolution – the Extended Synthesis, edited by M. Pigliucci and G. B. Müller, 403–41. The MIT Press.

Pigliucci, M. 2008. “Opinion – Is Evolvability Evolvable?” NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 9 (1): 75–82.

Date and time: July 2, Thursday,11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Laura Nuño de la Rosa

Title: Computing evo-devo. Mapping the dynamics and conceptual structure of the evolvability research front

Abstract: Although evolutionary developmental biology is widely seen as a well established discipline, there is still no agreement on the impact of the introduction of development into the general structure of evolutionary theory. It has recently been argued that philosophy of biology should shift the emphasis from theories to epistemic goals in evolutionary biology, and particularly in evo-devo (Brigandt 2010; Love 2010). In this view, the identity of evo-devo as a discipline does not lay in being a theory, but derives from the pursuit of specific epistemic goals, such as the explanation of evolvability, evolutionary novelty or homology. On the other hand, the development of big data–based approaches and computational analytical methods is revolutionizing the field of the history  of science (Laubichler, Maienschein, and Renn 2013).  In this paper, I will apply these two new approaches to the history and philosophy of science to the study of evolvability, a research topic which is usually taken to be a cornerstone of evo-devo and, more generally, of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (Pigliucci 2008).

Brigandt, I. 2010. “Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology.” Erkenntnis 73 (3): 295–311.

Chen, C. 2006. “CiteSpace II: Detecting and Visualizing Emerging Trends and Transient Patterns in Scientific Literature.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 57 (3): 359–77.

Galison, P. 1999. “Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief.” The Science Studies Reader, 137–60.

Laubichler, M. D., J. Maienschein, and J. Renn. 2013. “Computational Perspectives in the History of Science: To the Memory of Peter Damerow.” Isis 104 (1): 119–30.

Love, A. C. 2010. “Rethinking the Structure of Evolutionary Theory for an Extended Synthesis.” In Evolution – the Extended Synthesis, edited by M. Pigliucci and G. B. Müller, 403–41. The MIT Press.

Pigliucci, M. 2008. “Opinion – Is Evolvability Evolvable?” NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 9 (1): 75–82.

Date and time: Monday, June 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: James diFrisco (KU Leuven / Universidad Católica de Lovaina)

Title: Individuality and the Limits of Biological Functionalism

Abstract: According to ordinary intuition, living individuals and organisms are the same thing. Many of our moral and legal practices are connected to organism-based conceptions of individuality. For example, we grant rights to animal organisms rather than to their cells conceived as individuals, and assign moral responsibility to persons in a group rather than to the group as an individual—usually. Developments in biology, however, have indicated that familiar organisms are just one case of individuality among others, such as genes, cells, colonies, groups, species, and even ecosystems. It has therefore become a genuine problem to explain what it is in general that makes something a biological individual.

My project takes its point of departure from the inadequacy of the evolutionary explanation currently on offer, in which being an individual just means being a unit of selection. Instead of opposing this by recourse to more physiological explanations of individuality, however, I suggest it will be more illuminating to place both within a more general framework. I propose to do this by introducing two new elements to the debate: a (1) process-based and (2) hierarchical view of individuality. The first ensures that individuality receives a deeper explanation as a product of fundamental biological processes; the second, that different individuals are explained in terms of processes at different levels—whether they be physiological, evolutionary, or otherwise.

Date and time: Wednesday, June 3, 11.00 am.

Venue: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14.

Speaker: William Bechtel (U. California, San Diego)

Title: Minimal Cognition

Date and time: Monday, June 1, 11.30 am.

Venue: Multipurpose Room (Faculty of Philosophy)

Speaker: William Bechtel (U. California, San Diego)

Title: Mechanistic explanation and beyond (pdf)

Date and time: Friday, May 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Sara Diani (Lahnhöhe Zentrum, Lahnstein, Germany)

Title: Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?

Abstract: In the clinical practice we approach diseases with a linear logic, not a complex one, focusing us on a little part of the organism, ignoring what happens in the other compartments. Anytime we try to treat a disease, we make several attempts because we don’t have a unifying and logical model that can help us to define a rational method. Our empiricism would need a consequent rational analysis of it, in order to properly analyze the results.

In other words, except for the studies done by the philosophers of medicine, we do not use a clear model of what is health and what is disease. To this aim the connection between philosophical and theoretical systemic approach to our body and its reactions, the science of complex systems, the study about networks and the “field discipline” in physics, and finally the clinical practice has been here explored.

A new model of interaction between body, environment and disease, by using the latest theories of physics and biology, and the concept of heuristic learning (based on the event and error) is proposed. The disease is triggered by environmental information (except for the genetic ones), and it is an active process, performed through the individual characteristics. Through heuristic learning the system develops its own “best response” to the information in that moment. This will follow the rules of the live organism: to maintain low entropy, the best order possible, and to use the least energy.

This idea has a central role in defining and treating the diseases.

The ratio between medical and biological paradigms with a systemic and holistic perspective could allow us to revolutionize the cures for the patient, to do more effective research to understand deeply the results with the final goal of a new, higher and wider level of medicine.

Date and time: Friday, May 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Sara Diani (Lahnhöhe Zentrum, Lahnstein, Germany)

Title: Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?

Abstract: In the clinical practice we approach diseases with a linear logic, not a complex one, focusing us on a little part of the organism, ignoring what happens in the other compartments. Anytime we try to treat a disease, we make several attempts because we don’t have a unifying and logical model that can help us to define a rational method. Our empiricism would need a consequent rational analysis of it, in order to properly analyze the results.

In other words, except for the studies done by the philosophers of medicine, we do not use a clear model of what is health and what is disease. To this aim the connection between philosophical and theoretical systemic approach to our body and its reactions, the science of complex systems, the study about networks and the “field discipline” in physics, and finally the clinical practice has been here explored.

A new model of interaction between body, environment and disease, by using the latest theories of physics and biology, and the concept of heuristic learning (based on the event and error) is proposed. The disease is triggered by environmental information (except for the genetic ones), and it is an active process, performed through the individual characteristics. Through heuristic learning the system develops its own “best response” to the information in that moment. This will follow the rules of the live organism: to maintain low entropy, the best order possible, and to use the least energy.

This idea has a central role in defining and treating the diseases.

The ratio between medical and biological paradigms with a systemic and holistic perspective could allow us to revolutionize the cures for the patient, to do more effective research to understand deeply the results with the final goal of a new, higher and wider level of medicine.

Date and time: Friday, May 8, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Sara Diani (Lahnhöhe Zentrum, Lahnstein, Germany)

Title: Complex systems and clinical medicine: do they have fitting points?

Abstract: In the clinical practice we approach diseases with a linear logic, not a complex one, focusing us on a little part of the organism, ignoring what happens in the other compartments. Anytime we try to treat a disease, we make several attempts because we don’t have a unifying and logical model that can help us to define a rational method. Our empiricism would need a consequent rational analysis of it, in order to properly analyze the results.

In other words, except for the studies done by the philosophers of medicine, we do not use a clear model of what is health and what is disease. To this aim the connection between philosophical and theoretical systemic approach to our body and its reactions, the science of complex systems, the study about networks and the “field discipline” in physics, and finally the clinical practice has been here explored.

A new model of interaction between body, environment and disease, by using the latest theories of physics and biology, and the concept of heuristic learning (based on the event and error) is proposed. The disease is triggered by environmental information (except for the genetic ones), and it is an active process, performed through the individual characteristics. Through heuristic learning the system develops its own “best response” to the information in that moment. This will follow the rules of the live organism: to maintain low entropy, the best order possible, and to use the least energy.

This idea has a central role in defining and treating the diseases.

The ratio between medical and biological paradigms with a systemic and holistic perspective could allow us to revolutionize the cures for the patient, to do more effective research to understand deeply the results with the final goal of a new, higher and wider level of medicine.

Date and time: Monday, April 27th, 11.30 am.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14