IAS-Research Seminar by Michael Beaton (UPV-EHU & Sussex): “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” IAS-Research Seminar by Michael Beaton (UPV-EHU & Sussex): “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World”IAS-Research Seminar by Michael Beaton (UPV-EHU & Sussex): “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World”

Date and Time: June 13, Monday, 11:00 a.m.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Michael Beaton (UPV-EHU & Sussex)

Title: Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World

Abstract: 

Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception which is currently generating a lot of interest within mainstream analytic philosophy. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. The sensorimotor theory of perception, on the other hand, initially generated a lot of interest within mainstream cognitive science, but has not yet delivered on its early promise of changing fundamentally the way in which cognitive scientists think about perception. Here I will argue that sensorimotor theory and direct realism complement each other very well, and that the resultant theory – sensorimotor direct realism – is a scientifically tractable alternative to the dominant, mainstream, representationalist approach within cognitive science. I will argue for the apparently philosophically radical claim that we directly perceive objects themselves, showing how this claim can be understood in a way which makes it amenable to normal scientific study. Objects are analysed as a kind of collaboration between the world and the perceiver. On this account, whilst we never perceive outside the categories of our own understanding, we do, literally, perceive outside our own heads, with no intermediary representations required.

Presentation based on three pieces recently published in Constructivist Foundations.

Date and Time: June 13, Monday, 11:00 a.m.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Michael Beaton (UPV-EHU & Sussex)

Title: Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World

Abstract: 

Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception which is currently generating a lot of interest within mainstream analytic philosophy. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. The sensorimotor theory of perception, on the other hand, initially generated a lot of interest within mainstream cognitive science, but has not yet delivered on its early promise of changing fundamentally the way in which cognitive scientists think about perception. Here I will argue that sensorimotor theory and direct realism complement each other very well, and that the resultant theory – sensorimotor direct realism – is a scientifically tractable alternative to the dominant, mainstream, representationalist approach within cognitive science. I will argue for the apparently philosophically radical claim that we directly perceive objects themselves, showing how this claim can be understood in a way which makes it amenable to normal scientific study. Objects are analysed as a kind of collaboration between the world and the perceiver. On this account, whilst we never perceive outside the categories of our own understanding, we do, literally, perceive outside our own heads, with no intermediary representations required.

Presentation based on three pieces recently published in Constructivist Foundations.

Date and Time: June 13, Monday, 11:00 a.m.

Location: Carlos Santamaría Building, Room B14

Speaker: Michael Beaton (UPV-EHU & Sussex)

Title: Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World

Abstract: 

Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception which is currently generating a lot of interest within mainstream analytic philosophy. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. The sensorimotor theory of perception, on the other hand, initially generated a lot of interest within mainstream cognitive science, but has not yet delivered on its early promise of changing fundamentally the way in which cognitive scientists think about perception. Here I will argue that sensorimotor theory and direct realism complement each other very well, and that the resultant theory – sensorimotor direct realism – is a scientifically tractable alternative to the dominant, mainstream, representationalist approach within cognitive science. I will argue for the apparently philosophically radical claim that we directly perceive objects themselves, showing how this claim can be understood in a way which makes it amenable to normal scientific study. Objects are analysed as a kind of collaboration between the world and the perceiver. On this account, whilst we never perceive outside the categories of our own understanding, we do, literally, perceive outside our own heads, with no intermediary representations required.

Presentation based on three pieces recently published in Constructivist Foundations.